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Abstract 
We argue that the emotion of guilt, in the sense of actual 
harm done to others from inappropriate action or inaction, is 
worthwhile to incorporate in evolutionary game models, as 
it can lead to increased cooperation, whether by promoting 
apology or by inhibiting defection. The study thereof can 
then transpire to abstract and concrete populations of non-
human agents. 
 Psychological Background 
Theorists conceive of shame and guilt as belonging to the 
family of self-conscious emotions (Lewis 1990) (Fischer 
and Tangney 1995) (Tangney and Dearing 2002), invoked 
through self-reflection and self-evaluation. Though both 
have evolved to promote cooperation, guilt and shame can 
be treated separately. Guilt is an inward private phenome-
non, though it can promote apology, and even spontaneous 
public confession. Shame is inherently public, though it 
may too lead to apology and to the request for forgiveness 
(Smith 2008, pp. 96-107). Shame, however, hinges on be-
ing caught, failing to deceive, and the existence of a repu-
tation mechanism.  
 
The philosopher Martin Buber (Buber 1957) underlined the 
difference between the Freudian notion of guilt, based on 
internal conflicts, and existential guilt, based on actual 
harm done to others, which is the sense we are considering 
here. On transgression or error, the self renders judgment 
on itself. This self-evaluation may be explicit or implicit, 
conscious or unconscious. Shame and guilt typically arise 
from the blaming self-judgment about one's negative per-
sonal attributes (shame) or about negative harmful personal 
behaviour or failure to act to prevent harm (guilt). Shame 
is often conducive to hiding and anger, and guilt is often 
conducive to admission and reparative action. Guilt is con-
sidered empathic whereas shame not (Tangney et al. 2013, 
pp. 485-502). We leave out shame for now, because it in-
volves reputation, and concentrate on guilt instead. 
 
To avoid or attempt to prevent blame assignment that 
might result from inappropriate action or inaction, there 
exists a guilt mechanism concerned not just with a posteri-
ori guilt for a harm actually intended, but functions as well 
a priori, preventing harm by wishing to avoid guilt. A pos-
teriori outward admission of guilt may serve to pre-empt 
punishment, whenever harm detection and blame become 
foreseeable. 
 
We know too that guilt may be alleviated by private con-
fession (namely to a priest or a psychotherapist) plus the 
renouncing of past failings in future. Because of their pri-
vate character, such confessions and atonements, given 
their cost (prayers or fees), render temptation defecting less 
probable. Public or open confession of guilt can be coordi-
nated with apology for better effect, and the cost apper-
tained to some common good (like charity), or as individu-
al compensation to injured parties. 
 
More generally, Frank has suggested humans have been 
endowed during evolution with the means to solve prob-
lems of commitment by means of  "moral sentiments", to 
wit, those of anger, contempt, disgust, envy, greed, shame, 
and guilt (Frank 1988, pp. 46, 53).  
Moral sentiments help solve such problems because honest 
manifestation of certain emotions make commitments more 
credible.  
 
In particular, the promises of an agent known to be prone 
to guilt are therefore trustworthier. Heightened anger to-
wards non-confessed guilt might be triggered by intention 
recognition, thereby putting pressure on guilt admission. 
Exhibition of guilt proneness by an agent may assuage oth-
er agents that defection by the agent was not intended, 
even when it might be clear it was not, since intention as-
cription by others is not perfect. 
 
If intentions provide such a role in determining due apolo-
gy, how can one read an offender's mental states? We regu-
larly judge the mental states of others, and the notion of 
mens rea1 in criminal law depends on this ability. An of-
fender's emotions, namely feelings of guilt, provide a 
measure of his mental states (Smith 2008, p. 96). Fake 
emotions better be discerned, of course. (Smith 2008, pp. 
96-107) elaborates on detecting and distinguishing guilt, 
shame, embarrassment, remorse, and regret.  
 
From (Smith 2008, pp. 101-103) we quote, abridging:  
'According to (Rawls 1971), "shame is the emotion 
evoked by shocks to our self-respect" but we feel 
guilty when we "act [...] contrary to [our] sense of 
right and justice." Both involve our sense of morality, 
but in guilt "we focus on the infringement of just 
claims of others and the injury we have done to them, 
and on their probable resentment and indignation 
should they discover our deed."  
In shame "we feel struck by the loss to our self-esteem 
and our inability to carry out our aims: we sense the 
diminishment of self from our anxiety about the lesser 
respect that others may have for us and from our dis-
appointment with ourself for failing to live up to our 
ideals." A single wrongdoing might provoke feelings 
of both shame and guilt, but the primary distinction 
involves the emphasis on either my disappointment 
with myself (shame) or my concern for the victims 
and norms I have transgressed (guilt).  
[p. 102] Understood in accordance with the earlier de-
scription, guilt would seem like an appropriate emo-
tional component of apology because it accompanies 
the recognition of wrongdoings as such. When we 
identify and share a commitment to the value underly-
ing a transgression, guilt would appear to designate 
the corresponding emotion. As an undesirable emo-
tion, guilt also spurs us to undertake the reform and 
redress likely to free us from its clutches.  
[p. 103] Negative emotions can have a deterrent value 
in that potential offenders may resist urges to commit 
offenses if they wish to avoid the unpleasant feelings 
of guilt or shame that may accompany their deed. 
Negative emotions may also serve rehabilitative ob-
jectives because an experience of guilt may move an 
offender to reform her behaviour.' 
                                                
1 Mens rea, the intention or knowledge of wrongdoing that 
constitutes part of a crime, as opposed to the action or con-
duct of the accused. Compare with actus reus, action or 
conduct that is a constituent element of a crime, as opposed 
to the mental state of the accused. ORIGIN: mid 19th cent.: 
Latin, literally ‘guilty mind.’ 
 
Furthermore, according to (Tangney et al. 2013, pp. 494-
496), guilt-prone individuals are inclined to manage anger 
constructively, and disinclined toward aggression. And 
they are less prone to defection and noise. 
 
Guilt is the quintessential moral emotion: it promotes the 
acknowledgment of wrongdoing, the acceptance of respon-
sibility, and the taking of reparative action. Expressions of 
guilt restore equanimity, reaffirm fairness, and compensate 
transgressions. Guilt leads to positive intra- and inter-
personal processes, especially in contexts requiring coop-
eration. 
Evolutionary Background on Guilt and      
Cooperation 
If foreseen guilt prevents harm and absence of harm pre-
vents possible retaliation and/or loss of reputation, then it 
would seem that a priori guilt would be evolutionarily ad-
vantageous. A posteriori guilt, on the other hand, would be 
evolutionarily advantageous because conducive to in-
creased amount/possibility of apology, and we've seen 
apology is advantageous. Also apology reduces the pain of 
guilt. 
 
Evolutionarily, guilt is envisaged as an in-built mechanism 
that tends to prevent wrong doing because of the internal 
self suffering it creates, and, should the wrong doing have 
taken place, it puts internal pressure on confession (admit-
ting the wrong) and follow-up costly apology and penance, 
plus an expectation of forgiveness, so as to alleviate and 
dispel the internal suffering produced by guilt (Fessler and 
Haley 2012, pp. 7-36) (Tangney et al. 2013, pp. 485-502). 
Using the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and Ultimatum 
games (Ketelaar and Tung Au 2003, pp. 429-453) found 
that guilt is a key factor in increasing cooperation among 
players. 
 
It would pay for guilt to have spread once it appears, on 
two counts: as an inhibition mechanism and as a for-
giveness stimulus. A third count, in our view, is that coun-
terfactually thinking about guilt or shame is useful to pre-
vent their future arising, a process of self-cleansing or self-
debugging (Niedenthal, Tangney, and Gavanski, 1994). 
Counterfactual thinking, in turn, arises to explain causality 
in general, being subsequently used to handle guilt and 
self-improvement. Hence, guilt-dealing mechanisms seem 
to be evolutionarily advantageous for cooperation. 
 
It seems clear that an evolutionary anthropological case 
about guilt has been made and accepted in the literature for 
intention recognition. Intentionality matters crucially to 
distinguish intended actions from noise, from accidental 
actions, and from side effects, since non-intended harms 
should be discounted because they are unavoidable, and a 
revenge arms race would be pernicious to all. 
 
The notion of intentionality is ascribed to agents, and in 
particular to gods and nature spirits. The latter ones have 
the power to exercise justice with regard to acts of killing 
animals and slashing cultivars (which are living beings). 
When it doesn't rain, or some tragedy happens, it is as-
cribed to wrath of the gods or animal spirits symbolised by 
totems. Performing human or other sacrifices is meant to 
atone and apologise for the harm done to other living be-
ings.  
 
That's how guilt has arisen evolutionarily, as humans know 
that the spirits know what you did (and even about 
thoughts and memories inside your head about doing it on 
purpose) though no one might have witnessed your deed. 
Guilt and apology are primed by their moral disapproval 
and by revenge. 
 
Population morality in turn arises for a great number of 
reasons (namely starting with mutualism and following on 
to contractualism), plus in particular making sure that one's 
intentions can be explained and do follow the accepted 
rules and exceptions. The literature on morality already 
makes the case in detail, albeit according to distinct 
schools of thought. Some of these are closer than others to 
the mechanisms that we know in AI. 
 
The Baldwin effect describes an inclination for general 
learning mechanisms to open the way to domain-specific 
adaptations. Agent-based simulation models have shown 
that a moderate bias toward prosocial behaviour is fa-
voured in evolving populations where punishment for anti-
social behaviour becomes dominant (Cushman and 
Macendoe 2009). Guilt may be a primer for a Baldwin ef-
fect by which harm is partly avoided, and where punish-
ment for harm is diminished by forgiveness of costly con-
fession and apology. Moreover, the pain of guilt, even a 
non-confessed one, acts as internal punishment, and so 
may serve as an internal evaluation mechanism to under-
mine one's defection (Damasio 1994) (Mameli 2004). Guilt 
signalling, having a cost in terms of accrued apology, 
comes under the "handicap principle" (Zahavi 1975) (Za-
havi 1997), and that makes it "honest" or reliable, rather 
than deceitful. 
 
Hence, on these counts, guilt will have been selected for 
prosociality. 
Guilt Treating by Evolutionary Game Theory 
The evolutionary issue about guilt is whether it is more 
worthwhile than the absence of guilt, with respect to emer-
gence of cooperation. One would speak of guilty explicitly, 
and show that it's worthwhile, thus explaining its appear-
ance on the evolutionary scene. 
 
Guilt is widespread, for some reason, and we should show 
that it naturally connects with apology and forgiveness 
mechanisms, because of its emergent evolutionary ad-
vantage. Moreover, it does not seem too difficult to incor-
porate guilt into present frameworks involving apology and 
forgiveness (Martinez-Vaquero et al. 2015). It would mean 
duplicating each possibly defecting strategy into one expe-
riencing guilt and a corresponding guiltless one. 
 
This would open the way to the treatment of emotions as 
evolutionary mechanisms scaffolding cooperation, guilt be-
ing a widely acknowledged one. Furthermore, it would 
show that one does not need a specific kind of body (name-
ly an anthropomorphic one) for guilt to be a functional use-
ful emotion in population settings where cooperation is 
good value. 
 
One may focus on emotions as being strategies in abstract 
evolutionary population games, sans specific embodiment 
(Pereira 2016). One adds guilt (and, for that matter, possi-
bly guilt promoted counterfactual reasoning) as an evolved 
means to trigger costly apology, to expect a better chance 
of forgiveness, and to assuage the inner guilt that prompts 
the triggering. 
 
The hypothesis, then, is that the emergence of guilt in a 
population is evolutionarily advantageous.  
 
We can test this hypothesis via our already existing model 
comprising apology, revenge, and forgiveness, by piggy-
backing guilt onto them (Martinez-Vaquero et al. 2015). 
We might introduce a zero/one guilt parameter, which, on 
defaulting, not only increases the probability of apology 
(confession), but also, spontaneously pays a costlier apolo-
gy, as the means to atone for internal guilt (through the re-
dressing towards the co-player), rather than simply apolo-
gising. 
 
On the other hand, the co-player will more readily accept a 
guilty apology and forgive. Indeed, this co-player attitude 
will favour in the population his own forgiveness by oth-
ers, in case of his confession of guilt, instead of simple 
apology in the absence of guilt. 
 
The prediction is that guilt will facilitate and speed-up the 
emergence of cooperation. In spite of its initial heavier 
cost, in time the cost will be recuperated within the guilt-
ridden population. One reason being that it is compensated 
by the costlier guilt apology of others, another reason being 
that it is more conducive to forgiveness. 
 
To emphasise our point: the experiments would need to 
explore different initial situations from the ones already 
considered. Instead of albeit different but homogenous val-
ues of costly apology, the population would start with het-
erogeneous values of overall costly apology: a base cost 
(the apology) plus the added guilt cost. 
 
Testing would mean that in the social imitation step the 
guilt and the forgiveness thresholds would also be copied, 
not just the strategy. One would start with a good mixture 
in the population of these two threshold factors, including 
zero guilt, within each of the strategies that defect and also 
within those that forgive, to see which factors pervade, for 
some apology compensation. 
 
So, for each defaulting strategy, there would exist in the 
population both individuals with guilt and those without 
(say 50%-50% at the start). For the moment we would fix 
the forgiveness threshold. Guilt or its absence would be 
transmitted by social imitation too. 
 
The base hypothesis is that when there is guilt in the start-
ing population then the most frequent stationary distribu-
tion includes guilt and better cooperation. For which level 
of guilt this would happen would have to be experimental-
ly found. Next, for that best level of guilt, we want to find 
a best level of probability of forgiveness, still starting with 
a mixed guilty/non-guilty population. 
 
An additional possibility is to investigate guilt as a mecha-
nism that diminishes defection. This would probably be 
tied to intention recognition, since guilt will have evolved 
as a fear about the detection of harm done (see above). 
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